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11  The Constitutional Court of South 
Africa: Reinforcing an hourglass  
System of Multi-Level Government1
nico steytler
I. Introduction
“The supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law” are two founda-
tional values of South Africa’s 1996 Constitution (s. 1(c)). An independent 
judiciary is thus set to play a major role in interpreting and enforcing the 
Constitution. With some significant federal elements in the Constitution, 
such as establishing provincial and local orders of government, the courts, 
with the Constitutional Court at the apex, are bound to give shape and 
texture to this system of government. Since 1995, the Constitutional Court 
as well as the Supreme Court of Appeal and high Court have asserted the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the separation of powers, establishing 
a jurisprudence that gives effect to the principle of limited government. 
however, in interpreting the federal arrangements, the Constitutional 
Court has not given full effect to the self-rule elements of provincial gov-
ernment. Instead, it has more often enforced local government’s constitu-
tional “right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of 
its community” (s. 151(3)). Furthermore, while soft on the substantive con-
tent of provincial self-rule, it has scrupulously policed compliance with the 
procedural rules of intergovernmental relations. The Court’s jurisprudence 
has given further credence to the hourglass model of multi-level govern-
ment; provinces are squeezed thin from the top by a dominant national 
government and from below by powerful metropolitan governments.
 1 helpful suggestions by my colleagues Jaap de visser, Derek Powell, and the 
anonymous reviewers are much appreciated. This work is also based is upon research 
supported by the South African Research Chairs Initiative of the Department of 
Science and Technology and National Research Foundation.
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II. Federal System
1. The Broad Characteristics
South Africa’s 54 million people are diverse. Africans, comprising 
nine linguistic communities, constitute 80.2 per cent of the population, 
followed by Coloureds (a mixed-race category at 8.8 per cent), whites 
(8.4 per cent), and Indian or Asian (2.5 per cent).2 A few million undocu-
mented inhabitants (the precise number unknown), originating from 
neighbouring countries, notably Zimbabwe, should be added to the 
total. Eleven official languages are constitutionally recognized, and the 
percentage breakdown of the major language groups is IsiZulu (22.7); 
IsiXhosa (16); Afrikaans (13.5); English (9.6), Sepedi (9.1); Setswana (8); 
and Sesotho (7.6).3 Although the explicit intention was not to create 
ethnically based provinces, seven of the nine provinces have a linguis-
tic majority. South Africa is regarded as a middle-income country at 
US$12,900 GDP per capita in 2014; yet it shows one of the highest levels 
of income disparity (income Gini coefficient 0.69),4 with nearly half of 
the population living in poverty spread across urban and rural areas.
Following the demise of apartheid, the interim Constitution of 1993 
established two orders of government – the national government and 
nine provinces. Although local government was recognized in the 1993 
Constitution (mainly as a provincial competence), the 1996 Constitu-
tion elevated it to a “sphere” of government alongside the national and 
provincial governments (s. 40(1)).5
 2 Statistics South Africa, Stats in Brief 2014 (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 2014),  
table 2.3.
 3 Statistics South Africa, Census 2011: Census in Brief (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 
2012), 24, figure 2.3.
 4 OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: South Africa 2015, 7, http://www.treasury.gov.za/
publications/other/OECD%20Economic%20Surveys%20South%20Africa%202015.pdf.
 5 For further background, see Nico Steytler, “Republic of South Africa,” in Constitutional 
Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr, 
311–46 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005); Christina 
Murray, “Republic of South Africa,” in Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Governance 
in Federal Countries, ed. Katy le Roy and Cheryl Saunders, 258–88 (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); and Jaap de visser, “Republic of 
South Africa,” in Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems, ed. Nico 
Steytler, 267–97 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009); Chris 
Tapscott, “Republic of South Africa: An Uncertain Path to Federal Democracy,” 
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The 1993 Constitution was a peace treaty between the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the white minority regime. The low-intensity civil 
war that commenced in 1960 was also taken to the black homeland 
governments, which were regarded as collaborators of the apartheid 
government. The formation of the nine provinces was a key compro-
mise between the incumbent white regime and some homeland leaders, 
notably Chief Mangosuthu buthelezi from KwaZulu, who championed 
a strong federal system for ethnic accommodation as well as limiting the 
power of the centre. however, the ANC demanded a strong centre in 
order to transform the society after three centuries of racial oppression. 
The outcome of the “negotiated revolution” was a weak form of federal-
ism, showing strong unitary elements.6 Although there were four “inde-
pendent” homelands (recognized as such only by South Africa) and six 
self-governing territories (giving effect to the grand apartheid design 
based on ethnicity), the formation of provinces in 1994 was a process of 
devolution; a largely centralized system, ultimately under the control of 
the white minority regime, devolved into nine provinces.
The peace negotiations were essentially the business of political 
parties, most notably the (white) National Party (NP) and the ANC. 
because the result was a negotiated constitution, the ANC’s demand for 
a democratically based constitution was met with the undertaking that 
within two years a final constitution would be drafted by a democrati-
cally elected Constitutional Assembly. The NP’s fears that the gains it 
made at the negotiating table would be swept aside by an elected ANC 
majority were met by the condition that the new constitution had to 
comply with a number of negotiated constitutional principles, which 
included protection of the provincial system.
The 1996 Constitution’s hybrid federal system, eventually certified 
by the Constitutional Court as complying with the Constitutional Prin-
ciples,7 has been in operation ever since, with no significant changes. 
 in Political Parties and Civil Society in Federal Countries, ed. Klaus Detterbeck, Wolfgang 
Renzsch, and John Kincaid, 199–226 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 
2015); Derek Powell, “Constructing a Developmental State in South Africa: The 
Corporatization of Intergovernmental Relations,” in Intergovernmental Relations in 
Federal Systems: Comparative Structures and Dynamics, ed. Johanne Poirier, Cheryl 
Saunders, and John Kincaid, 305–49 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2015).
 6 Ronald L. Watts, “Is the New South African Constitution Federal or Unitary?,” in 
Birth of a Constitution, ed. bertus de villiers (Cape Town: Juta, 1994), 75, 86.
 7 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) 
bCLR 1253 (CC) (“First Certification judgment”).
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Giving effect to the self-rule elements of the hybrid federal system has 
entailed the subnational governments being responsible for 62 per cent 
of the total state expenditure; in the 2013/14 financial year, provinces 
(responsible for the wage bill of teachers and medical staff) expended 
36 per cent and municipalities 26 per cent.8
because the ANC never fully embraced the negotiated solution, 
the system has been under review since 2007.9 The other two mem-
bers of the ruling ANC alliance – the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – 
are outspoken in criticizing the provinces and advocating their aboli-
tion. In contrast, the major opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, 
which captured the Western Cape province in 2009, and again, with 
an increased majority, in 2014, is a strong proponent of the provincial 
system. It not only seeks to exploit the opportunities provided by the 
current system, but also uses good governance in the Western Cape as 
the platform for its political campaign to capture other provinces.
Although the high level of maladministration and corruption preva-
lent in a number of provinces has not endeared them to the public or 
the national government, strong elites coagulated around such govern-
ments, thus making major constitutional reform unlikely.10 This was 
reflected in the ANC’s 53rd National Conference resolution in Decem-
ber 2012 that effectively retained the provincial system by requiring 
that “provinces [should] be reformed, reduced and strengthened.”11 
What is also on the cards is the continual growth of metropolitan gov-
ernment.12 The formation in 2000 of six major metropolitan municipali-
ties (increased to eight in 2011) has resulted in ever-increasing demands 
 8 National Treasury, Budget Review 2014 (Pretoria: National Treasury, 2014), 93, and 
table 7.1.
 9 ANC, “Legislature and Governance for a National Democratic Society,” Policy 
Discussion Documents, ANC 52nd National Conference 2007, Umrabula Publication 
(Marshalltown: African National Congress, 2007). See further Nico Steytler “The 
Politics of Provinces and the Provincialisation of Politics,” in Law, Politics and Rights: 
Essays in Memory of Kader Asmal, ed. Tiyanjana Maluwa, 191–214 (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2014).
 10 Steytler, “Politics of Provinces and the Provincialisation of Politics.”
 11 ANC, Resolutions of 53rd National Conference: Legislatures and Governance, 
Resolution 4.2.1 (2012).
 12 National Planning Commission, National Development Plan: Our Future – Make It Work 
(Pretoria: National Planning Commission, 2012), 435. See also De visser “Republic of 
South Africa,” 292.
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for more functions at the expense of provinces. Over the last few years, 
the important provincial functions of transport and housing have been 
slowly assigned to the metropolitan councils.
With constitutional supremacy a core principle of the Constitution,13 
the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction covers all aspects of the federal 
arrangement. As such, the Court has the power to invalidate legisla-
tion and executive action compelling the fulfilment of constitutional 
obligations (s. 2). Even though the system of multi-level government 
has operated for two decades, the Constitutional Court has not had a 
dominant hand in shaping the system; at best, its role can be described 
as middling.
2. Structural Features
The Constitution provides that “government is constituted as national, 
provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, inter-
dependent and interrelated” (s. 40(1)). The “distinctive” characteristic 
reflects the measure of “self-rule” of provinces and local government; 
they have entrenched powers and functions and access to revenue 
sources. The Constitution provides detailed provisions for the function-
ing of provincial legislative and executive structures and procedures. 
It also envisages national legislation on provincial administration and 
financial management.14 As the constitutional provisions with regard 
to local government are more schematic, national legislation structures 
the establishment of municipalities and their internal organizations, 
functioning, and financial management.15
Following an integrative federal approach, the allocation of powers 
and functions to provinces and municipalities allows for an interwo-
ven and complementary system. First, most provincial functions are 
 13 The establishment of constitutionalism in South Africa in 1994 finds resonance in 
the argument of Ran hirschl (Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the 
New Constitutionalism [Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 2004], 99); judicial 
empowerment through the constitutionalization of judicial review and a bill of rights is 
often a “conscious strategy undertaken by threatened political elites seeking to preserve 
or enhance their hegemony by insulating policy-making from popular political 
pressures and supported by economic and judicial elites with compatible interests.”
 14 Inter alia, the Public Service Act, 1994, and the Public Finance Management Act, 1999.
 15 See Municipal Structures Act, 1998; Municipal Systems Act, 2000; Municipal Finance 
Management Act, 2003; Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004; and Municipal Fiscal 
Powers and Functions Act, 2007.
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concurrent with the national government, the principal functions being 
education, health, social welfare, housing, agriculture, and transport 
(sch. 4). Much more limited are exclusive provincial powers, which 
include ambulance services, liquor licences, provincial planning, pro-
vincial roads, and traffic control (sch. 5). The adoption of a provin-
cial constitution, although within narrow parameters, is perhaps the 
only “true” exclusive power. Local government’s constitutionally 
entrenched, but not exclusive, powers include electricity reticulation, 
water and sanitation, municipal public transport, municipal health 
services, municipal planning, and municipal roads and traffic (schs. 
4b and 5b). The national legislative powers are almost supreme; not 
only does Parliament have all residual powers, but it may also trump 
competing concurrent provincial legislation through a qualified over-
ride clause (s. 146), as well as exclusive provincial legislation on more 
limited grounds (s. 44(2)). both the national and provincial legislatures 
may regulate the entrenched local government powers (s. 155(7) and 
schs. 4b and 5b).
In the constitutional scheme, the national Parliament may assign 
any of its legislative powers (save very specific ones) to provinces and 
municipalities. Provinces may likewise assign any of their powers to 
municipalities. Municipalities, on the other hand, may claim the assign-
ment of both national and provincial matters if such matters would 
most effectively be administered locally (s. 156(4)).
Although the definitions of the various functional areas are often 
opaque (e.g., the precise differences between national, provincial, and 
local health services), there is, in the main, agreement on the allocated 
functions. however, contestation occurs on the cut-off points between 
functional areas, appropriate allocation of some functions (e.g., housing 
and transport), and unfunded mandates.
Within the paradigm of constitutional supremacy, the Constitutional 
Court has the final word on the definition of functional areas. The 
national Parliament has also on occasion circumscribed the content of 
broad functional areas by, for example, defining provincial and local 
health responsibilities in the National health Act, 2003.
Differing from the German constitutional model on which the South 
African system of “cooperative government” is based, the Constitution 
does not prescribe national framework legislation that must be comple-
mented by provincial laws. It does, however, envisage national laws in 
the terrain of provincial and local governance, as indicated above. In 
the case of local government, however, both the national and provincial 
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governments may legislate regulatory frameworks for the exercise of 
local competences (ss. 155(6)(a) and 155(7)).
The Constitution contains specific provisions to deal with conflict-
ing concurrent national and provincial laws by allowing a national 
law to trump a provincial law if certain broad conditions are met 
(s. 146). The override sets, however, a low hurdle for national legisla-
tion. First, for example, national legislation prevails if a matter “can-
not be regulated effectively” by provinces individually (s. 146(2)(a)). 
Moreover, the interpretational guidance in the Constitution is equally 
broad. First, courts are guided by the principle that they must always 
prefer a reasonable interpretation of the conflicting legislation that 
would avoid the conflict above an interpretation that results in conflict 
(s. 150). Second, in considering a further override test, namely, whether 
national legislation is “necessary” to maintain national security, eco-
nomic unity, and a common economic market, etc., courts must have 
“due regard to the approval or the rejection of the National Council 
of Provinces” (s. 146(4)), but there is no indication how such decision 
is to be used. Third, there is a built-in default position in favour of 
the national government; if a court cannot resolve the conflict, the 
national legislation prevails over the provincial legislation (s. 148). 
In case of a conflict, the law that does not prevail is not invalid but 
merely becomes inoperative.
Constitutional supremacy is also reflected in the amendment proce-
dures. The Constitution may be amended only by a two-thirds majority 
of the National Assembly following a special procedure. In the case of 
the founding values in section 1, a three-quarters majority is required. 
Depending on the nature of the amendment, the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP) (and thus the provinces) has an important veto 
(s. 74). Any amendment of section 1 and the bill of Rights requires 
the consent of at least six of the nine provinces. Also, in respect of any 
amendment that affects the NCOP, or alters provincial boundaries, 
powers, functions, or institutions, at least six of the nine provinces must 
consent. Moreover, if the amendment affects only a specific province or 
provinces (such as a boundary change), the consent of the legislature(s) 
of those provinces is required. The two-thirds majority rule also applies 
to the amendment of provincial constitutions (s. 144).
Although there is no requirement of subjecting amendments to a 
popular referendum, the Constitutional Court has interpreted the leg-
islative process as requiring adequate public participation. Indeed, 
the Court has invalidated legislation on the basis of insufficient public 
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participation,16 including a constitutional amendment that changed the 
boundaries of the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape.17
As the upper guardian of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
plays a pivotal role in interpreting the Constitution’s federal elements 
when matters are brought to it. Provincial constitutions do not see the 
light of day unless the Constitutional Court has certified that they com-
ply with the required constitutional prescripts (s. 144). Given the rela-
tive newness of the system and the limited litigation due to the near 
dominance of the ANC in the provinces, it is premature to map how the 
Court has altered the operation of the federal system; yet the trend has 
been favourable to local government but not to the provinces.
The NCOP is one of the pivotal institutions intended to effect an inte-
grative federalism. As the name suggests, it is a council of provinces 
that participates in the national legislative process. The NCOP is thus 
described in the Constitution as representing “the provinces to ensure 
that provincial interests are taken into account in the national sphere of 
government. It does this mainly by participating in the national legisla-
tive process and by providing a national forum for public consideration 
of issues affecting provinces” (s 42(4)). Owing some dues to its bundesrat 
progenitor, each province is represented by a ten-member delegation: 
four are members of the provincial legislature (with the premier being 
the leader of the delegation) and six are indirectly elected by the provin-
cial legislatures to serve at the legislatures’ pleasure a term of five years. 
Coming almost as an afterthought, but a logical consequence of the rec-
ognition of local government as a sphere of government, organized local 
government has ten representatives in the NCOP, who may participate 
in proceedings when the interests of local government are at issue, but 
may not vote (s. 67).
III. Court System
1. Introduction
Coming from a long tradition of parliamentary supremacy, the 
advent of democratic rule in 1994 also meant a shift to constitutional 
 16 Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, 2006 
(12) bCLR 1399 (CC).
 17 Matatiele Municipality and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, 2007 (1) bCLR 47 (CC).
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supremacy and the rule of law. Given that the “revolution” was nego-
tiated, there was no breach of legal continuity; the laws in operation 
in 1994 continued to apply to the extent that they were compliant with 
the new constitutional dispensation. This, too, applied to the common 
law; it had to comply and be developed in conformity with the bill of 
Rights.
The 1993 and 1996 Constitutions preserved the distinction between 
the high Court of general jurisdiction and the lower courts with lim-
ited jurisdiction. The Appellate Division, the highest court before 1994, 
now called the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), continued as the high-
est court in all matters other than constitutional. Final constitutional 
adjudication was reserved for the newly created Constitutional Court. 
The separate roles of the SCA and the Constitutional Court were neces-
sitated by the apartheid past. With all judges from the apartheid era 
continuing in their positions, final interpretation of the new supreme 
Constitution could not be left in the hands of the SCA. The Constitu-
tional Court was thus established, with only four of the eleven justices 
drawn from sitting judges. As court of final jurisdiction on constitu-
tional matters, this Court has also the final word on the constitutional 
framework for multi-level government in South Africa. The Consti-
tution thus makes specific provision that the Constitutional Court is 
the only court that can “decide disputes between organs of state in 
the national or provincial sphere concerning the constitutional status, 
powers and functions of any of those organs of state” (s. 168(4)). The 
Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 has now unified the 
appellate structure by making the Constitutional Court the final arbiter 
also in non-constitutional matters.
The new constitutional order entrenched the judiciary as a national 
competence. No constitutional provision was made for provincial or 
local courts. A high Court division has been established for every prov-
ince, with their jurisdictions coinciding with provincial boundaries. All 
the courts function in an integrated appellate system. There are appeals 
from the lower courts to the high Court, from the high Court to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, and from there to the Constitutional Court. 
On constitutional matters, an appeal lies either directly to the Constitu-
tional Court (with leave given in few cases) or via the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. Where the high Court invalidates a national or provincial law, 
or presidential conduct, as being unconstitutional, there is an “auto-
matic” review by the Constitutional Court; unless the Court confirms 
the invalidity, the law or conduct stands (s. 167(5)).
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As a trial court, the high Court proceedings are presided over by a 
single judge. In criminal cases, the judge is joined by two lay assessors. 
Lower court appeals to the high Court are heard by two or three judges. 
In the latter case, minority judgments can be delivered. In appeals to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, criminal cases are heard by a three-judge bench, 
while other appeals require a five-judge bench. In the Constitutional Court, 
a minimum of eight of the eleven justices forms a quorum. All decisions 
appear under the name of the judges. Only the Constitutional Court has 
on rare occasions delivered its judgments en banc, without reference to the 
justice who wrote them. Those occasions were of high political significance 
such as the certifications of the 1996 Constitution18 and the provincial con-
stitutions of KwaZulu-Natal19 and the Western Cape.20 Dissenting judg-
ments are possible and not infrequent. In the Constitutional Court’s 2007 
term, no fewer than in a third of the twenty-seven judgments contained 
dissenting opinions,21 with the percentage in the 2008 term being thirty-
nine,22 remaining the same for the 2012 term.23 This is a decrease from the 
48 per cent of 2006 judgments with dissenting opinions, while the average 
for the previous decade was only 23 per cent. Judgments of the high Court 
and appellate courts are published as well as the dissenting opinions.
Rooted in the common-law system, the doctrine of precedent is 
applied firmly by the courts. The Constitutional Court has asserted this 
doctrine of stare decisis even with regard to judgments originating from 
the apartheid era, subject, of course, to not being in conflict with the 
Constitution. The high Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court. Even the two appellate 
courts are bound by their own decisions unless they are satisfied that 
the previous decision was “clearly wrong.”24
 18 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) 
SA 744 (CC) para. 287 (“First Certification” judgment).
 19 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996, 1996 
(11) bCLR 1419 (CC) (“KwaZulu-Natal Constitution”).
 20 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 (9) bCLR 1167 (CC).
 21 Liza Chamberlain and Sha’ista Kazee, “Constitutional Court Statistics for the 2007 
Term,” South African Journal on Human Rights 26 (2010): 571, table 3.
 22 Samantha brener, Michael Eastman, and Jennifer Macleod, “Constitutional Court 
Statistics for the 2008 Term,” South African Journal on Human Rights 27 (2011): 566, 
table 3.
 23 Saflii.org.za (analysis of the 34 judgment in the 2012 term).
 24 Camps bay Ratepayers and Residents Association v. harrison, 2011 (2) bCLR 121 
(CC) para. 28. See further, see Jason brickhill, “Precedent and the Constitutional 
Court,” Constitutional Court Review 3 (2010): 79–110.
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2. Constitutional Status of Courts and Judicial Officers
An entire chapter of the Constitution is devoted to the courts and the 
administration of justice. having complied with the Constitutional Princi-
ples that there should be “a separation of powers between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness,”25 the relationship between 
the courts and the other branches of government is clearly set.26 The judi-
cial authority is vested in the courts (s. 165(1)), comprising the courts men-
tioned above. The Constitution, though, provides for national legislation 
to further regulate the judicial system. As the judiciary is a national com-
petency, provinces and municipalities play no role in their functioning, 
bar two exceptions. First, the provinces via the NCOP nominate four of 
its permanent delegates as members to the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC). In addition, the premier of the province is a member of the JSC when 
it considers a matter relating to the high Court in that province. The sec-
ond exception is the establishment of a “municipal” court. A municipality 
may pay for the salary of a nationally appointed magistrate, whose task is 
then to adjudicate the enforcement of municipal by-laws.
Central to the appointment of judges to the higher courts stands the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC). It was created in 1994 as a clear 
break with the long-standing practice of executive appointments, 
under which the first black judge was appointed only in 1991.27 In the 
new constitutional state, not only is the independence of the judici-
ary entrenched, but the process of appointment also is more transpar-
ent and less controlled by the executive. The JSC’s members comprise 
representatives from the judiciary (three, including the chief justice as 
chairperson), the minister of justice, the legal profession (four), law 
schools (one), the National Assembly (six, three of whom must be 
opposition MPs), NCOP delegates (four), presidential nominees (four), 
 25 Constitutional Principle vI Schedule 4 1993 Constitution.
 26 In National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries and Others (Licensed Animal Trainers Association and two 
amici curiae intervening) 2013 (1) bCLR 1159 (CC), the Constitutional Court affirmed 
the importance of the principle of the separation of powers when it invalidated 
provisions in a 1935 law that gave magistrates the task of issuing licences for 
exhibiting and training performing animals, because it was an administrative function 
totally unrelated to the judicial function.
 27 yvonne Mokgoro, “Judicial Appointments,” Advocate (December 2010): 44.
This content downloaded from 196.11.235.238 on Tue, 09 Apr 2019 11:47:09 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Constitutional Court of South Africa 339
and the judge-president and premier of a province where a matter con-
cerns the high Court in that province.
Despite the overhaul of the appointment process, there is still a strong 
executive hand in appointments to the top curial positions. The president 
appoints the chief justice and his or her deputy after consultation with 
the JSC and the leaders of the political parties in the National Assembly. 
The president needs to consult the JSC with regard to the appointment of 
the president and deputy president of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
When it comes to the nine justices of the Constitutional Court, the presi-
dent appoints them from a list provided by the JSC (there must be three 
names more than the vacant positions). For the appointment of all other 
judges, the president must follow the JSC’s advice. Giving effect to the con-
stitutional imprimatur that “the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the 
racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered when 
judicial officers are appointed” (s. 174(2)), by July 2014 of the 243 judges, 
63.4 per cent (147) were black and 32.5 per cent were women.28 Further-
more, the tradition of appointing judges from the ranks of senior advocates 
only has been tempered; a number of attorneys (solicitors), magistrates, 
and a few law professors have been elevated to the bench.
The JSC’s conduct has also come under criticism. Given the ANC’s 
strong hand in the JSC’s composition (at least twelve of twenty-three 
would be directly linked to the ruling party through the executive and 
the legislature), claims of political and biased appointments have been 
levelled. In 2011, the Cape bar Council successfully challenged the JSC 
for not appointing an outstanding white candidate to the Western Cape 
high Court as being arbitrary and irrational.29
The bedrock of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law is 
the independence of the judiciary. The Constitution thus proclaims, “The 
courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice” 
(s. 165(2)). The independence of the judiciary is entrenched through the 
usual techniques. First, judges have tenure until reaching a specified age. 
 28 Nomthandazo Ntlama, “The Transformation of the South African Judiciary: A 
Measure to Weaken Its Capacity?,” 9 table 3, New york Law School, http://www.
nylslawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/10/Ntlama.pdf.
 29 Cape bar Council v. Judicial Service Commission and Another (Centre for 
Constitutional Rights and Another as Amici Curiae), 2012 (4) bCLR 406 (WC), 
upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Judicial Service Commission and 
Another v. Cape bar Council and Another 2012 (11) bCLR 1239 (SCA).
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before then, their removal requires a finding by the JSC that a judge suffers 
from incapacity, is grossly incompetent, or is guilty of gross misconduct. 
This finding must then be supported by a two-thirds vote in the National 
Assembly. Second, their salaries, allowances, and benefits may not be 
reduced. Third, after a long wrangle with the executive, the budget of the 
courts was placed under the control of the chief justice.30
The judiciary’s independent functioning has not gone uncontested. 
The first serious volley fired over the bow of the courts was the state-
ment of the secretary-general of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, that some 
courts were “counter revolutionaries,” stymieing the national demo-
cratic revolution.31 These sentiments were echoed by senior ministers in 
the national executive. Even President Jacob Zuma weighed in against 
the Constitutional Court when he ordered a review of the judgments of 
that Court, stating that the courts cannot be regarded as always right 
when they produce dissenting opinions. Furthermore, the president’s 
choice of the current chief justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng, was widely criti-
cized because he was the least experienced judge on the Constitutional 
Court. In each case where the Constitutional Court imposed positive 
obligations on the state to fulfil socio-economic rights, the complaint by 
government has been that the judiciary was not respecting the separa-
tion of powers. These volleys were, no doubt, instigated by government 
being on the losing side most often32 and thus perceiving the Court as an 
obstacle to its governing.
 30 Superior Courts Act, 2013.
 31 See Sapa, “ANC Defends Mantashe’s Remarks on Judges,” Polityorg.za, 11 July 
2008, http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-defends-mantashes-remarks-on-
judges-2008-07-11.
 32 In the Constitutional Court’s 2007 term, the Court found in favour of the 
government only in eight of eighteen cases (47 per cent) (Chamberlain and Kazee, 
“Constitutional Court Statistics 2007,” table 7). The percentage of state success in 
2008 was lower at 44 per cent (brener, Eastman, and Macleod, “Constitutional Court 
Statistics 2008,” 567). In 2011 alone the national executive lost a number of crucial 
decisions: invalidating the placement a special investigative unit (formerly known 
as the Directorate of Special Operation, called “the Scorpions,” now renamed the 
Directorate of Priority Crime Investigations, called “the hawks”), which fell under 
the jurisdiction of the largely autonomous National Prosecuting Authority, under 
the South African Police Service (and executive control) (Glenister v. President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others, 2011 (7) bCLR 651 (CC)); the unconstitutional 
extension of Chief Justice Ngcobo’s term of office (Justice Alliance of SA v. 
President of the RSA and Two Similar Applications, 2011 (10) bCLR 1017 (CC)); the 
invalidation by the SCA of the presidential appointment of the national director of 
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Matters came to a head when the North Gauteng high Court issued 
an interim order that the government could not allow the sitting presi-
dent of Sudan, Omar al-bashir, who was attending an African Union 
Summit in Johannesburg in June 2015, to leave South Africa, pending 
a determination whether South Africa should arrest him and hand 
him over to the International Criminal Court to face charges of geno-
cide and war crimes. Not only did the government deliberately diso-
bey the court order (see further below), but Cabinet ministers and the 
ANC unleashed a barrage of criticism against the judiciary.33 Mantashe 
proclaimed that the courts were biased against the ruling party and 
that certain courts had “a negative attitude towards government.”34 At 
the centre of the complaint was the accusation that the courts did not 
respect the separation of powers. Instead, they “overreached” into the 
domain of the executive.
The ANC’s attacks on the judiciary have raised grave concerns over 
the past few years. The first chief justice in the democratic South Africa, 
Arthur Chaskalson, warned that the attacks against the judiciary com-
ing from senior politicians “undermine the constitutional order and 
pose a threat to our democracy.”35 he admonished politicians who 
want to rein in the courts rather to direct their fury to the Constitution, 
which the courts interpret. Public outcry against political interference 
has been severe from some legal quarters. For example, a civil-society 
organization, Freedom under Law, under the leadership of former 
 public prosecutions (Democratic Alliance v. President of the RSA and Others, 2012 
(3) bCLR 291 (SCA)). In 2014 some provisions of the South African Police Services 
Amendment Act, 2012, which sought to align the Act with the Court’s judgment 
in Glenister (see above), were also invalidated for failing to secure adequate 
independence for the hawks (helen Suzman Foundation v. President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others; Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 
2015 (1) bCLR 1 (CC)).
 33 Editorial, “This Is a Country of Laws,” City Press, 21 June 2015.
 34 “Gwede Mantashe Criticises Judiciary as being Problematic,” ENCA, 23 June 2015, 
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/gwede-mantashe-criticises-judiciary-being-
problematic.
 35 Address on 29 January 2012, University of Cape Town. Arthur Chaskalson, 
“When Law Irks Power,” Times Live, 29 January 2012, http://www.timeslive.
co.za/2012/01/29/when-law-irks-power. See also the concerns of former chief 
justice Sandile Ngcobo, “Sustaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary: An 
eEssential Condition for Realising the Judicial Role,” South African Law Journal  
128 (2011): 5.
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Constitutional Court judge, Johan Kriegler, has sought through legal 
challenges to overturn the JSC’s overtly political decisions.36
After the attacks on the judiciary following the al-bashir debacle, the 
judiciary responded; under the leadership of the chief justice, senior 
judges convened in July 2015 and expressed their dismay at what they 
termed “general gratuitous criticism” by Cabinet ministers and the ANC. 
Chief Justice Mogoeng and a few senior judges then met in August with 
President Zuma and a coterie of Cabinet ministers to discuss judicial 
“overreach” and the separation of powers. From all accounts, the judici-
ary was not cowed; both sides agreed to respect the separation of powers, 
exercise caution when criticizing each other, and respect and comply with 
court orders.37 This meeting was followed by another in November, this 
time between Zuma, Mogoeng, and the chairpersons of the two houses 
of Parliament, in order for the three arms of government to discuss mat-
ters of mutual concern. Whether the planned twice-yearly meetings will 
strengthen the separation of powers or undermine it is too early to tell.
3. Institutional Role of the Courts
The organization of the court system shows some specialization. Start-
ing from the top, the Constitutional Court has the final say on consti-
tutional matters and exclusive jurisdiction concerning, among other 
things, the validity of national legislation and certain intergovernmen-
tal disputes. The Supreme Court of Appeal had final appellate jurisdic-
tion on all matters other than constitutional matters. This space was 
increasingly narrowed as the Constitutional Court decided what is 
and what is not constitutional. As noted above, the split in jurisdic-
tion has ended; in terms of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment 
Act of 2012, the Constitutional Court is also the final appellate court in 
any non-constitutional matter that “raises an arguable point of law of 
general importance.”38 The high Court in each province has general 
 36 hlope v. Premier of the Western Cape; hlope v. Freedom under Law and Others 
(Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Others as Amicus Curiae), 2012 (1) bCLR 
1 (CC). A number of civil society organizations successfully challenged the 
unconstitutional extension of Chief Justice Ngcobo’s tenure (Justice Alliance of SA v. 
President of the RSA and Two Similar Applications, 2011 (10 bCLR 1017 (CC)).
 37 “‘historic’ Meeting Falters on Separation of Powers,” Legalbrief, 31 August 2015, 
http://legalbrief.co.za/story/historic-meeting-falters-on-separation-of-powers-3/.
 38 See Mbata v. University of Zululand 2014 (2) bCLR 123 (CC).
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original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction from its own ranks as 
well as from the magistrates’ courts. The high Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited by the specific jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Labour 
Appeal Court (on labour matters), the Competition Appeal Court (on 
competition law), the Electoral Court, and the Land Claims Court (on 
land reform).
In line with common-law jurisdictions, such as the United States 
and Australia, South African courts, as a rule, entertain live disputes 
only. The establishment of the Constitutional Court has, however, 
introduced abstract review. Setting the tone, one of the Court’s first 
tasks was assessing whether the 1996 Constitution complied with the 
Constitutional Principles set forth in the 1993 Constitution. The 1996 
Constitution further embedded abstract review in three instances. 
First, the president may refuse to sign a bill into law if he or she has 
doubts about its constitutionality and then refer the matter to the 
Constitutional Court for an opinion.39 A similar power is bestowed on 
premiers of provinces with regard to provincial bills.40 Second, a third 
of the members of the National Assembly may place an act assented 
to by the president before the Constitutional Court to decide on its 
constitutionality (s. 89). A similar procedure applies to provincial 
legislatures where the support of only 20 per cent of the members is 
required (s. 120). The third instance is the duty of the Constitutional 
Court to certify whether a provincial constitution or amendment 
thereto complies with the national Constitution (s. 144).
The generous standing rules should also be mentioned. In human 
rights litigation (as well as other constitutional matters), public inter-
est litigation is encouraged by the Constitution, permitting any person 
“acting in the public interest” to approach a court (s. 38(d)). Also, as can 
be gleaned from the case citations in this chapter, civil-society organi-
zations often participate in litigation before the Constitutional Court as 
friends of the court (amici curiae).
Reflecting on the practice of the Constitutional Court (for the years in 
which tallies were kept), conflicts relating to governance issues, includ-
ing disputes between organs of states, constitute a tiny minority of 
 39 See Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa: in re: Constitutionality of the 
Liquor bill, 2000 (1) bCLR 1 (CC) (“Liquor bill”).
 40 See Premier: Limpopo Province v. Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature and 
Others, 2011 (11) bCLR 1181 (“Limpopo I”).
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cases. In 2007, only one case dealt with a non–bill of Rights provision 
of the Constitution. This pattern is also evident in the preceding years.41
4. Curial Procedures
The low number of federalism-related cases can be attributed to two fac-
tors. First, with eight of the nine provinces and all but one of the major 
cities under ANC control, intergovernmental disputes between ANC-
controlled organs of state are usually resolved through intra-party direc-
tions or mediation. however, a divergent practice has emerged of late; 
the ANC-controlled Johannesburg Metropolitan Council challenged the 
ANC-governed Gauteng provincial government over the proper defini-
tion of “municipal planning” and won.42 The second factor is the principle 
of cooperative government that eschews the solution of intergovernmen-
tal disputes through litigation (s. 41(1)(h)(vi)). This obligation has teeth; 
a court may refer a dispute back to the litigants when it is satisfied that 
the parties did not make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by 
means other than litigation (s. 42(2)).43 Such other means, including medi-
ation, are provided for, among others, in the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act, 2005. In a dispute between district municipalities and 
the National Treasury about the entitlement of the former to an equita-
ble share of the revenue raised nationally, the Court refused to hear the 
case, because the municipalities had failed to utilize an intergovernmen-
tal forum, the budget Council, to settle the matter.44 Consequently, federal 
issues are raised more often than not by private parties when they advance 
their cause. For example, a community concerned with the substantive 
issues regulated by the Communal Land Rights Act, 2009, challenged the 
validity of the law on a procedural ground that reflects a federal element; 
the correct legislative procedure was not followed in the NCOP, thereby 
depriving the provinces of their say in the legislative process.45
 41 Chamberlain and Kazee, “Constitutional Court Statistics for the 2007 Term,” 571.
 42 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Gauteng Development Tribunal, 
2010 (9) bCLR 859 (CC) (“Gauteng Development Tribunal”).
 43 See, for example, National Gambling board v. Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, 2002 
(2) bCLR 156 (CC) (“National Gambling board”); Minister of Police and Others v. 
Premier of the Western Cape and Others, 2013 (12) bCLR 1405 (CC).
 44 Uthekela District Municipality and Others v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others, 2002 (11) bCLR 1220 (CC).
 45 Tongoane and Others v. Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2010 (8) bCLR 741 
(CC).
This content downloaded from 196.11.235.238 on Tue, 09 Apr 2019 11:47:09 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Constitutional Court of South Africa 345
The superior courts are equipped with wide discretion over reme-
dies to enforce the Constitution. A court must declare invalid any law 
or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution. To mitigate the 
impact of such a declaration, a court has the discretion to “make any 
order that is just and equitable” (s. 172(1)). Such an order may include 
limiting the retrospective effect of a declaration of invalidity, or sus-
pending such a declaration for a period of time on conditions it may 
stipulate. In practice, the Constitutional Court has invalidated a num-
ber of laws and in some instances suspended their invalidity for up to 
eighteen months so as to allow Parliament to remedy the constitutional 
defect. The courts may also issue a mandamus for the fulfilment of a 
constitutional obligation.
The courts operate very transparently. Court proceedings are open to 
the public, and courts are increasingly allowing television cameras into 
the courtroom, as glaringly illustrated by the 2014 murder trial of para-
Olympian Oscar Pistorius, who was convicted of culpable homicide 
(similar to involuntary manslaughter in the United States). Judgments 
are delivered in public (and most often within a reasonable time), and 
those of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal are 
readily available on these courts’ websites.46 The Constitutional Court 
also provides media releases on all its judgments. but litigation is, in 
general, prohibitively expensive. Despite a legal-aid system, which 
focuses mainly on criminal defence, access to justice is not readily avail-
able to the poor or even the middle class.
Former chief justice Ismael Mohamed wrote that in the absence of any 
physical force at their disposal, the courts’ “ultimate power must there-
fore rest on the esteem in which the judiciary is held within the psyche 
and soul of the nation.”47 Such esteem has been widespread, as Chief 
Justice Sandile Ngcobo confirmed: “Enforcement of court decisions and 
orders has not been an issue in this country.”48 The problem has arisen 
in some divisions of the high Court where, for example, court orders 
that pensions should be paid out regularly were not executed, leading 
 46 For judgments of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, see 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, www.constitutionalcourt.org.za, and Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa, http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/judgments/
judgem_sca_2012.html.
 47 Ismael Mohamed, “The Role of the Judiciary in a Constitutional State,” South African 
Law Journal 115 (1999): 111, 112.
 48 Ngcobo, “Sustaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary,” 5.
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to successful class actions.49 The first open defiance of a court order came, 
as noted above, when the national government let President al-bashir 
leave the country, despite an interim order prohibiting that. In question 
was whether South Africa was obliged to execute a warrant for his arrest 
issued by the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide and 
war crimes. South Africa not only ratified the Rome Statute establishing 
the court, but it also domesticated the statute in legislation, in terms of 
which it was bound to execute the court’s arrest warrants. A civil society 
organization obtained an interim order to prevent al-bashir from leaving 
the country, but the national government facilitated his escape. The interim 
order was confirmed by the high Court, finding that the government was 
indeed obliged to execute the arrest, rejecting the government’s argument 
that it acted in accordance with its diplomatic obligations towards the 
AU.50 The circumstances of the case may be unique, but it came on the 
back of a long-running attack on the alleged “overreach” of the judici-
ary. The commitment by the president at his August meeting with Chief 
Justice Mogoeng to respect court orders may be a turning point, but the 
likely government response will be the appointment of more compliant 
judges so as to reduce possible conflicts with the executive.
5. Judicial Culture
Functioning on a common-law foundation, the judiciary played a major 
role in developing the legal system within the constraints of the apartheid 
legal order. In the 1980s, some social critics called for “moral” judges to 
resign their offices in an act of protest against an abhorrent system, but 
the dominant liberal view was that judges, given their relative but lim-
ited autonomy, could do more to blunt the hard edge of apartheid and 
repression through the ethical performance of their judicial duties than by 
resigning. Arguments based on the rule of law and human rights could, 
unlike in the Nazi courts, be validly raised and were occasionally success-
ful. Former chief justice Ngcobo commented that the tradition of judicial 
integrity predates 1994.51 Despite many executive-minded judges, the 
 49 See Jayiya v. MEC Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another, 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA); MEC, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v. Kate, 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA).
 50 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
2015 (9) bLCR 108 (GP).
 51 Ngcobo, “Sustaining Public Confidence in the Judiciary,” 7. A fellow constitutional 
court judge, yvonne Mokgoro, is less charitable and refers to the “few maverick” judges 
who used the law to restrain the apartheid state (Mokgoro, “Appointment of Judges,” 44).
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integrity of the bench as a whole made legal continuity with respect to the 
judiciary not a bridge too far in the post-apartheid South Africa. Legal con-
tinuity also pertained to pre-1994 laws; they continued to apply, provided 
they were compatible with the Constitution. In the common-law tradition, 
most judgments were carefully reasoned. The Constitutional Court has 
continued to excel in providing path-breaking judgments on the bill of 
Rights that have been celebrated across the legal world, albeit not without 
criticism.
The role of the judiciary increased substantially under the Consti-
tution. With the supremacy of a broadly worded constitution firmly 
entrenched, the post-1994 courts have become a significant check and 
balance on the executive and the legislature. Moreover, it has become 
the institution of last resort when politics fail. For example, when the 
opposition parties failed to get a motion of no confidence in the presi-
dent tabled in the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, by a 
vote of five to four, held that the rules of the National Assembly were 
inconsistent with the Constitution to the extent that they did not allow a 
political party or a member to enforce the right to table such a motion.52 
While this leads to the judicialization of politics, it has also resulted in 
the politicization of the judiciary.53 Within this environment, as heinz 
Klug argues, the Constitutional Court has managed reasonably well the 
tension between “principled” reasoning on one hand and “institutional 
pragmatism” on the other.54
The Constitutional Court as final interpreter of the Constitution has 
followed a purposive approach to interpretation. The purpose of a pro-
vision is gleaned from a number of sources, mainly from the language 
used and the context or scheme of the Constitution, with historical 
 52 Masibuko v. Sisulu and Another, 2013 (11) bCLR 1297 (CC). See also Oriani-Ambrosini, 
MP v. Sisulu, MP, Speaker of the National Assembly, 2013 (1) bCLR 14 (CC).
 53 herschl, Towards Juristocracy, 203. See C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn vallinder, eds., The 
Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New york: New york University Press, 1995).
 54 heinz Klug, “Finding the Constitutional Court’s Place in South Africa’s Democracy: 
The Interaction of Principle and Institutional Pragmatism in the Court’s Decision 
Making,” Constitutional Court Review 3 (2010): 1–33. For a critique of the Court’s 
approach to one party dominance with respect to democracy, which has had a 
negative impact on “real” federalism emerging, see Sujit Choudhry, “‘he had a 
mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress 
in a Dominant Party Democracy,” Constitutional Court Review 2 (2009): 1–86. For a 
challenge on the premises of Choudhry’s argument, see Jonathan Klaaren, “Dominant 
Democracy in South Africa? A Response to Choudhry,” Constitutional Court Review 2 
(2009): 87–96.
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context being of subsidiary value. Consistent with this hermeneutical 
approach, the Constitutional Court viewed its task of interpreting the 
federal elements in a purposive manner; there were no different or addi-
tional, subject-specific principles of interpretation. In a decision dealing 
with the appropriate assignment of functions to provinces in terms of 
the interim Constitution, the Court said, in response to an argument 
that provincial powers should be construed restrictively, “In the inter-
pretation of those schedules [listing provincial powers] there is no pre-
sumption in favour of either the national legislature or the provincial 
legislatures. The functional areas must be purposively interpreted in 
a manner which will enable the national parliament and the provin-
cial legislatures to exercise their respective legislative powers fully and 
effectively.”55
The Court’s view that by such a purposeful reading (without any 
underlying presumption) the constitutional text will reveal itself, has 
resulted in a series of decisions that did not facilitate the ability of prov-
inces to exercise a measure of self-governance.
IV. Federalism Jurisprudence
1. Introduction
In an assessment in 2005 of judicial behaviour in the context of the fed-
eral elements of the Constitution, I argued elsewhere that the Constitu-
tional Court exhibited a pro-centre stance in the majority of cases that 
came before it, emphasizing the unitary language in the Constitution.56 
The explanation offered was that the Court’s stance was driven primar-
ily by two factors. First, the Court was concerned about national unity. 
After decades of the pernicious divide-and-rule of ethnic and racial 
groups, the first task was to forge a new nation through its state institu-
tions. The second factor was the need for order. Where the provinces in 
particular proved to be singularly inept to provide services effectively 
and efficiently, the Court stepped in as the bulwark of order. In the sea 
of provincial ineptitude, favouring the centre was inevitable.
 55 Dvb behuising (Pty) Limited v. North West Provincial Government and Another, 
2000 (4) bCLR 347 (CC), para. 17.
 56 Nico Steytler, “Judicial Neutrality in the Face of Ineptitude: The Constitutional Court 
and Multi-Level Government in South Africa,” in Judge Made Federalism, ed. h.-P. 
Schneider, J. Kramer, and b. Caravito (baden: Nomos verlag, 2009), 27.
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Since 2005, the Constitutional Court has not changed its tune appreci-
ably, although the record is not always centre-prone. What has changed 
is that local government has come off the better in its scraps with prov-
inces and the national government. Whether there is a decidedly pro-
local and anti-provincial attitude is too early to say, but the complexity 
of overseeing a multi-level system is now coming to the fore, and the 
balancing of the powers of the three spheres of government is that 
much more challenging.
Regarding these centre-prone decisions, the Court’s justification 
could be traced to a fundamental conception of the nature of the South 
African state. First, the proclamation in section 1 that South Africa is 
“one sovereign, democratic state” gives the Constitution a “unitary 
emphasis,” the Court has said.57 yet the Constitution contains very defi-
nite federal elements of local and provincial self-rule, which the Court 
has sought to harmonize with the unitary emphasis through the notion 
of “cooperative government.” In the words of the Constitutional Court, 
the Constitution embodies not “competitive federalism” but rather a 
“new philosophy” of “co-operative government.”58
In interpreting the Constitution’s federal features, the Court’s 
departure point is that provinces derive their powers and functions 
exclusively from the Constitution. In the first case on the exercise of 
concurrent powers (education) under the interim Constitution, minor-
ity political parties and the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government 
challenged the constitutionality of the National Education Policy bill, 
1995, on the ground that it would oblige provinces to adhere to national 
education policy.59 The applicants placed much reliance on the U.S. 
Supreme Court majority opinion in New York v. United States,60 which 
held that the U.S. Constitution did not confer on Congress the power 
to compel states to take particular actions. The Constitutional Court 
found this decision not relevant because of the differences in history 
and language of the two constitutions. In the United States, several sov-
ereign states where brought together in a federation, surrendering only 
a part of their sovereignty to the federal government and retaining the 
remainder. In South Africa, on the other hand, the provinces were not 
sovereign states: “They were created by the Constitution and have only 
 57 First Certification, para. 287. See also Liquor bill, para. 41.
 58 Ibid., para. 469.
 59 In re: The National Educational Policy bill, No. 83 of 1995, 1996 (4) bCLR 518 (CC).
 60 New york v. United States 505 US 144 (1992).
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those powers that are specifically conferred on them under the Con-
stitution.”61 Furthermore, the powers conferred on provinces were not 
exclusive but held concurrently with the national Parliament. The pro-
cess of state formation through devolution of powers to provinces thus 
produced a result that was significantly different from what prevails in 
the United States.
Within the limited parameters set by the Constitution, a measure 
of self-rule is permissible. Although the bill of Rights may impose 
uniform standards, total uniformity is not required. The Court thus 
rejected a claim that differing provincial legislation could give rise to 
an anti-discrimination challenge.62 A bookie taking bets at horse rac-
ing complained that he was discriminated against in KwaZulu-Natal 
because, in that province’s gambling law, only a person in his or her 
personal capacity could obtain a betting licence, contrary to the posi-
tion in all other provinces, where both a natural and a juridical per-
son could ply the bookmaking trade. The Court found that because the 
gambling law was within the province’s competence, it did not offend 
the right against unfair discrimination. Provincial differences were 
legitimate differentiation.
Provincial experimentation and innovation have not, however, been 
articulated expressly as a value worth pursuing. No reference has yet 
been made to the celebrated dictum of Justice Louis brandeis in New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann: “It is one of the happy incidents of the fed-
eral system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”63 One exception has been, but 
only so by implication, the Treatment Action Campaign case,64 where 
provincial differences were used in legal reasoning without highlight-
ing the value added of such experimentation. The Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC), a civil-society organization, challenged the decision 
of the national government and eight provinces to limit access to an 
anti-hIv drug to prevent mother-to-baby infection to two pilot sites 
per province. TAC argued that this measure was inconsistent with the 
socio-economic right of access to health services (s. 26), because it was 
 61 National Educational Policy bill, para. 23.
 62 Weare and Another v. Ndebele and Others, 2009 (4) bCLR 370 (CC), para. 70.
 63 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
 64 Minister of health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1), 2002 
(10) bCLR 1033 (CC), para. 93 (“Treatment Action Campaign”).
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unreasonable and the roll-out of the treatment to all clinics in provinces 
was within the provinces’ available resources – the conditions on which 
the fulfilment of this right are predicated. Their argument was based 
principally on the conduct of one province (the Western Cape), which, 
within the same budget as the other provinces, provided the medicine 
in all its clinics. The Constitutional Court (and the high Court more 
explicitly65) accepted the argument and found that the national govern-
ment’s efforts fell short of a reasonable standard and the province could 
afford to fulfil the positive obligation imposed by the right.66
In shaping the Constitutional Court’s federalism jurisprudence, 
supranational bodies have played no part. The Court has, more often 
in the earlier years, referred to American,67 Canadian,68 Indian,69  
German,70 and Australian71 cases, but has emphasized the unique his-
tory and language of South Africa’s constitutions. For example, in The 
National Education Policy Bill decision, referred to above, the Court thus 
cautioned, “Decisions of the courts of the United States dealing with 
state rights are not a safe guide as to how our courts should address 
problems that may arise in relation to the rights of provinces under our 
Constitution.”72
2. Specific Issues
Since the creation of South Africa’s hybrid federal system, the Consti-
tutional Court’s point of departure is that the provinces’ only source 
of authority is the Constitution. In the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
 65 Minister of health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, 2002 (4) 
bCLR 356 (T).
 66 Nico Steytler, “Federal homogeneity from the bottom Up: Provincial Shaping of 
National hIv/AIDS Policy in South Africa,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 33,  
no. 1 (2003): 59–74.
 67 KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, para. 24; Constitution of the Western Cape, para. 
28; Treatment Action Campaign, para. 107; Matatiele Municipality and Others v. 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2007 (1) bCLR 47 (CC) para. 79 
(“Matatiele Municipality”) .
 68 Liquor bill, para. 62; Dvb behuising, para. 36; Treatment Action Campaign, para. 
110; Matatiele Municipality, para. 66.
 69 Dvb behuising, para. 36; Treatment Action Campaign, para. 108.
 70 Treatment Action Campaign, para. 109; Matatiele Municipality, para. 36.
 71 KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, para. 24; Dvb behuising, para. 36;
 72 National Educational Policy bill, para. 23.
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Constitution Certification case, that constitution was rejected because 
it gave the province powers not found in the Constitution. The Court 
described it as a case where the province sought to pull itself up by its 
own federal bootstraps. Any power or function has thus to be located 
within the four corners of the Constitution, which, of course, requires 
an interpretation of the broad constitutional language.
Arguably the most important exclusive provincial power is the adop-
tion and amendment of a provincial constitution, the scope of which was 
forged in the last months before the first democratic election of 1994.73 
To bring the Inkatha Freedom Party into the negotiating process, a pro-
vision was inserted in the interim Constitution that a provincial con-
stitution could be different from the national Constitution with regard 
to “legislative and executive structures and procedures.”74 While the 
first provincial constitution drafted by the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature 
never attempted to comply with the provisions of the interim Consti-
tution, and was easily rejected by the Constitutional Court, the West-
ern Cape sought to remain within the parameters of the Constitution, 
even though it, too, pushed the constitutional envelope. The Western 
Cape’s draft constitution floundered principally on the interpretation 
of the elusive terms legislative structures and procedures. It not only set 
the number of seats of the provincial legislature but also established 
an electoral system that incorporated both a party list system and con-
stituency-based presentation to produce proportional representation 
(the national Constitution, although it stipulates that the system should 
“result, in general in proportional representation” [s. 105(1)(d)], pre-
scribes a pure party list electoral system). Averse to the idea that a prov-
ince could establish its own form of PR, the Constitutional Court gave 
a restricted interpretation of “legislative structures and procedures” by 
confining them to “no more than a difference regarding the nature and 
the number of the elements constituting the legislative structure.”75 The 
Court thus accepted the setting of the number of seats in the provincial 
legislature (as opposed to the constitutional requirement that the num-
ber must be set in terms of a formula prescribed by national legisla-
tion), but rejected the different electoral system. The latter conclusion, 
 73 See Nico Steytler and Johann Mettler, “Federalism and Peacemaking: A South 
African Case Study,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 31 (2001): 93–106.
 74 Section 143(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution is a similar provision.
 75 Western Cape Constitution, para. 48.
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commentators argued, was not the only credible one the Court could 
have reached.76
The interpretation of provinces’ other “exclusive” competences 
(those listed in Schedule 5A) received equally parsimonious treatment. 
At issue was the functional area of “liquor licences” and a national Liq-
uor bill that sought to control the liquor industry, including providing 
for the national issuing of licences for manufacturing, distribution, and 
local retail. The national Parliament may intrude on “exclusive” pro-
vincial powers, provided that certain qualifications are met, such as if it 
is “necessary,” inter alia, “to maintain national security, economic unity 
and essential national standards” (s. 44(2)). The question that the Court 
had to confront was whether all or any of the licences listed above fell 
in the provincial exclusive zone. The Court adopted a restrictive inter-
pretation; any aspect of the liquor trade that had an extra-provincial 
dimension fell outside the ambit of provincial competences. Provin-
cial exclusive powers apply “primarily to matters which may appro-
priately be regulated intra-provincially.”77 Intra-provincial matters are 
concerned with “activities that take place within or can be regulated 
in a manner that has a direct effect upon the inhabitants of the prov-
ince alone.”78 Excluded thus are matters with “a national dimension,”79 
which included all licences for manufacturing liquor (including all 
wine estates in the Western Cape), because such liquor may be destined 
to cross a provincial boundary. Only licences dealing with consumption 
within a province can be an exclusively provincial. The Court’s reason-
ing was based on the need for “economic unity,”80 which disallowed 
any regulatory spillage over a provincial boundary.
Other constitutional sources of provincial competences, apart from 
concurrent and exclusive powers, have also been met with a tight-fisted 
 76 Rassie Malherbe, “The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Development of 
Provincial Autonomy,” SA Public Law 16, no. 2 (2001): 255; Christina Murray, 
“Provincial Constitution-Making in South Africa: The (Non)example of the Western 
Cape,” Jahrbuch des Őffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 49 (2001): 481–512; Robert F. 
Williams, “Comparative Subnational Constitutional Law: South Africa’s Provincial 
Constitutional Experiments,” South Texas Law Review 40 (1999): 625; Stu Woolman, 
“Provincial Constitutions,” in Constitutional Law of South Africa, ed. Stuart Woolman 
and Michael bishop, 21-1–21-25 (Cape Town: Juta).
 77 Liquor bill, para. 53.
 78 Ibid., para. 72.
 79 Ibid., para. 75.
 80 Ibid., para. 76.
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Court, but dissenting voices are beginning to emerge.81 In Premier: 
Limpopo Province v. Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature and Others 
I,82 the issue was the constitutionality of a provincial bill to regulate 
the provincial legislature’s financial management. The bill would pass 
constitutional muster if the subject matter was “expressly assigned to 
the province by national legislation” or if it was a “matter for which a 
provision of the Constitution envisages the enactment of provincial leg-
islation” (s. 104(1)(b)(iii) & (iv)). The provincial legislature maintained 
that the power was “expressly assigned” to provinces by the national 
Financial Management of Parliament Act, 2009, although the reference 
to provincial legislation was only in a schedule.83 Focusing on the word 
expressly, the Court held that it “intended to remove any doubt about 
the nature and the extent of the powers of the provinces.”84 The Court 
maintained that “the constitutional scheme shows that the legislative 
authority of the provinces must be conveyed in clear terms.”85 In the 
Court’s opinion, the provincial bill did not have a firm constitutional 
footing because the national act did not expressly assign the power to 
 81 In the early decision of Executive Council of the Western Cape v. Minister for 
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development of the Republic of South Africa; 
Executive Council of KwaZulu-Natal v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, 1999 (12) bCLR 1360 (CC) the Constitutional Court did not support a generous 
interpretation of provincial powers over local government. The Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal, both in opposition hands, contested the constitutionality of a national 
law, the Municipal Structures Act, 1998, which gave to the national government the 
power to establish metropolitan areas and district management areas, a power the two 
provinces claimed belonged to them in terms of section 155. The Court agreed that 
this power did not fall in the domain of the national government, but neither did it 
resort under provinces. The power should be exercised by the Municipal Demarcation 
board, an independent constitutional institution. The Court found in favour of 
a provincial power only on a minor point. In terms of section 155(5), provinces 
determine the types of municipalities and not the national government, as the Act 
provided. See Jaap de visser, “Provinces v Structures Act: Demarcation board Walks 
Off with Spoils,” Local Government Law Bulletin 1, no. 4 (1999): 1–3.
 82 2011 (11) bCLR 1181 (CC) (“Limpopo I”).
 83 Six provinces drafted and adopted such legislation with the guidance of the National 
Treasury. That it was the intention of Parliament to assign such a power was also 
evident from the submission of the Speaker of Parliament to the Court (Premier: 
Limpopo Province v. Speaker: Limpopo Provincial Legislature and Others, 2012 (6) 
bCLR 583 (CC) (“Limpopo II”).
 84 Limpopo I, para. 23.
 85 Ibid., para. 35.
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the provinces (despite the fact that there was a direct reference to pro-
vincial legislation in the act).86
The same quest for clarity was applied to the second source of pro-
vincial powers, namely where legislation was “envisaged” by the Con-
stitution. Although the Constitution does not use the word expressly, the 
majority, nevertheless, imposed such a requirement. Speaking for the 
Court, Chief Justice Ngcobo held, “Our constitutional scheme does not 
permit legislative powers of the provincial legislatures to be implied. 
Were it to be otherwise, the constitutional scheme for the allocation of 
legislative power would be undermined. The careful delineation between 
the legislative competence of Parliament and that of provincial legisla-
tures would be blurred. This may very well result in uncertainty about 
the limits of the legislative powers of the provinces … This is not what the 
drafters of our Constitution had in mind.”87 This “clear line” scheme of 
the Constitution was contested in two dissenting opinions. Justice Edwin 
Cameron remarked that by the very nature of the Constitution’s drafting, 
clarity will remain “a chimera.”88 Moreover, he continued, “as a matter 
of fundamental outlook, it would seem to me surprising if the Constitu-
tion did not envisage that provinces may legislate for the financial man-
agement of their own legislatures.”89 The difference in judicial opinion 
was one of “fundamental outlook”; the majority adopted a parsimonious 
view of provincial space, while the dissents sought to breathe some life 
into “legitimate provincial autonomy.”
The Court’s parsimonious approach to provincial powers is perhaps 
explained by its experience of provincial dysfunctionality. In 2002, it took 
Mr Mashavha, who was entitled to a disability grant from the provincial 
government of Limpopo, more than two years to receive some but not all 
that was owed to him. his wife’s disability grant as well as his daughter’s 
child-support grant also were outstanding. he and his family, the Consti-
tutional Court noted, were reliant on “the proper administration of the dis-
ability grant for their daily sustenance and wellbeing.”90 Although “social 
 86 See Robert Williams and Nico Steytler, “Squeezing Out Provinces’ Legislative 
Competence in Premier: Limpopo Province v Speaker: Limpopo Provincial 
Legislature and Others I and II,” South African Law Journal 129, no. 4 (2012): 621–37.
 87 Limpopo I, para. 52.
 88 Ibid., para. 121.
 89 Ibid., para. 124.
 90 Mashavha v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2004 (12) bCLR 
1243 (CC) para. 9.
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welfare” is a national and provincial concurrent competency, Mashavha 
argued that the administration of the Social Security Act, 1992, in terms of 
which disability grants were dispensed, should never have been assigned 
to provinces when they were established in 1994 because such assign-
ment could be done only if the provinces had the capacity to administer 
it. The argument was thus that if the administration of the Social Security 
Act was not assigned to the provinces, Mashavha would have received 
his grant from a more competent national department. The Constitutional 
Court agreed and invalidated the assignment of the Social Assistance 
Act to provinces ten years after the assignment. before the fifteen-month 
period of suspension of invalidity lapsed, the South African Social Security 
Agency was established with the mandate to distribute all social grants. 
As the administration of grants was, along with education and health, the 
major expenditure item of provinces, the impact of the shift in responsibil-
ity on provinces was a massive loss in national transfers.
In 2013, a charge of incompetence was levelled against the national 
government. Civil society organizations requested the premier of the 
Western Cape to appoint a commission of inquiry into the abject failure 
of the national police (SAPS) to provide safety and security in Khayalit-
sha, a large black township of Cape Town. The Constitution provides for 
the appointment of such a provincial commission of inquiry into “any 
complaints of police inefficiency or a breakdown in relations between 
the police and any community” (s. 206(5)). When Premier helen Zille, 
who is also the leader of the opposition Democratic Alliance, appointed 
a commission, the national minister of police contested her constitu-
tional power to do so in a rare occurrence that the national government 
questioned a provincial competence largely because of provincial inac-
tivity. before the Constitutional Court, the national minister conceded 
the existence of such a power, but nevertheless contended that such 
a commission could not subpoena police officers because that would 
constitute controlling the national police force, a power that falls out-
side provincial competence. The Court first asserted a province’s right 
to oversee the SAPS’s activities in a province and then made short shrift 
of the minister’s contention, finding that without subpoenaing pow-
ers, a commission of inquiry would not be able to fulfil its mandate.91 
because the case was driven largely by a political agenda against an 
 91 Minister of Police and Others v. Premier of the Western Cape and Others, 2013 (12) 
bCLR 1405 (CC) (“Minister of Police”) para. 50.
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opposition-held province rather than by a contested legal principle, the 
judgment does not signal a fundamental shift in the Court’s approach 
to provincial powers. however, its significance lies in the fact that it 
was the province that sought to do something to ameliorate national 
government failure. The Court thus found that it was the duty of the 
premier to take reasonable steps “to shield the residents of Khayalitsha 
from an unrelenting invasion of their fundamental rights because of 
police inefficiency in combatting crime and the breakdown of relations 
between the police and the community.”92 As “there is much to worry 
about when the [national] institutions that are meant to protect vulner-
able residents fail, or are perceived to be failing,” it was appropriate 
for the province to exact accountability in terms of its constitutional 
powers.93 As will be argued below, the Court’s positive approach to 
the province’s efforts to assist in providing safety and security came in 
the face of national failure, a reversal of roles from the Mashavha case 
where the focus was on provincial failure.
When it came to interpreting local government’s powers, the Consti-
tutional Court showed a generosity of spirit at the expense of provincial 
powers. Contrary to the view of the majority in the Limpopo judgment, 
the Constitution is not a model of clarity when cut-off points between 
provincial and local government powers are in issue.94 The local gov-
ernment’s functional areas of health, roads, traffic, tourism, airports, 
and abattoirs are distinguished from similar provincial functional areas 
by the addition of the qualifier local to the former (e.g., local tourism 
vis-à-vis provincial tourism). Furthermore, many provincial functional 
areas are inclusive of a local government functional area. For example, 
included in the provincial power of “pollution control” is the local func-
tional area of “air pollution.” how are cut-off points to be determined?
The City of Johannesburg argued that the Gauteng provincial govern-
ment had no final decision-making powers on matters related to land-
use planning because this functional area fell in the local competence of 
“municipal planning.” Gauteng replied that its Development Tribunal 
could decide matters of land use because it fell within the provincial 
functional areas of “regional planning” and “urban and rural develop-
ment.” The Constitutional Court sided firmly with the city, reiterating 
 92 Ibid., para 51.
 93 Ibid., para 52.
 94 See Nico Steytler and yonatan Fessha, “Defining Local Government Powers and 
Functions,” South African Law Journal 124 (2007): 320–38.
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its view that competences must enable local government to exercise its 
functions “fully and effectively.”95 As most local government functions 
could be included in the broader powers of national and provincial 
government, the Constitutional Court implicitly adopted the view that 
local government functions should be defined first, with the residue 
falling in the provincial or national domain.96 Consequently, “munici-
pal planning,” which includes all questions relating to the zoning of 
land and the establishment of townships, are to be decided by the 
municipality.97
With “municipal planning” entrenched against provincial incursion, 
it could not be trumped by national legislation either. The fact that 
mining is an exclusive national competence does not mean, the Con-
stitutional Court held, that a national mining licence trumps municipal 
land-use permission. Rather, dual approvals are required; without such 
land-use permission from a municipality, the mining licence cannot be 
exercised.98
The Constitutional Court has also not hesitated to expand local gov-
ernment’s remit beyond what the Constitution prescribes. In a number 
of judgments on the state’s obligation to positively fulfil the implemen-
tation of socio-economic rights, the Court imposed duties on munici-
palities in areas falling outside their constitutional competences. In 
the area of housing (a concurrent national and provincial function), 
municipalities were ordered to assist national and provincial govern-
ments with the provision of emergency housing for the homeless99 and 
 95 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Gauteng Development Tribunal, 
2010 (9) bCLR 859 (CC) para. 49. See further Nico Steytler and Jaap de visser, Local 
Government Law of South Africa, 4th update (Durban: LexisNexis butterworth, 2011), 
5–19.
 96 This view was clearly expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. Gauteng Development Tribunal,  
2010 (2) bCLR 157 (SCA) paras 35–6.
 97 See also Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning of the Western Cape v. Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others, 
2014 (2) bCLR 182 (CC); Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs 
and Development Planning, Western Cape v. habitat Council and Others (City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality as Amicus Curiae), 2014 (5) bCLR 591 (CC).
 98 Maccsands (Pty) Ltd v. City of Cape Town and Others (Chamber of Mines of South 
Africa and Another as Amici Curiae), 2012 (7) bCLR 690 (CC); Minister of Mineral 
Resources v. Swartland Municipality and Others, 2012 (7) bCLR 690 (CC).
 99 Government of the RSA and Others v. Grootboom and Others, 2000 (11)  
bCLR 1169 (CC).
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the vulnerable after eviction from state or private property.100 These 
decisions were based on the constitutional obligation that rests on all 
spheres of government to realize the right of access to adequate hous-
ing (s. 26) and not on the listed municipal competences.
The other side of the parsimonious attitude toward provincial treat-
ment is the generous approach to national competences in respect to 
national legislation that covers both the national and provincial govern-
ments. One such law is on the single public service for the national and 
provincial administrations (s. 197(1)). The Western Cape objected when 
the national Public Service Act, 1994, was amended in 1998 because it 
removed provincial discretion on creating new departments. While the 
province could not challenge the national competence to make a law 
on the provincial public service, it argued that such a power should 
be exercised in the light of the principles of cooperative government, 
including the principle that “all spheres of government must exercise 
their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of the 
government of another sphere” (s. 41(1)(g)). The Constitutional Court 
accepted this principle as judicially enforceable but found that the very 
intrusive provisions complained of did not offend this principle.101
In contrast to the Court’s stinginess with respect to the substance of 
provincial powers, it has given full effect to the provinces’ procedural 
rights to shared rule institutions. As noted above, the provinces through 
their representation in the NCOP form part of the national Parliament 
and have, although not an absolute veto, a significant voice in the pas-
sage of national legislation affecting provinces (s. 76). Further, a con-
stitutional amendment that effects boundary changes must be passed 
by six of the nine provinces in the NCOP as well as with the consent of 
the affected provincial legislatures. The first notable case dealt with the 
latter issue. In order to eliminate municipalities that crossed provincial 
boundaries (because the latter followed apartheid-drawn magisterial 
districts), boundaries of seven provinces were amended by the Consti-
tution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005. Although the KwaZulu-Natal 
and Eastern Cape provincial legislatures voted for the amendment, the 
 100 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v. blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd and Another (Lawyers for human Rights as Amicus Curiae), 2012 (2) 
bCLR 150 (CC).
 101 Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v. President of the RSA, 1999 (4) bCLR 
382 (CC).
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community of Matatiele (which was to be moved from KwaZulu-Natal to 
the Eastern Cape without its consent) contested the legitimacy of the vote 
because Matatiele was not properly consulted by the provincial legisla-
ture. The Constitutional Court agreed by asserting, first, the need for pro-
vincial consent for a boundary change and, second, the need for proper 
consultation on the basis of the constitutional principle of participatory 
democracy.102 The provisions of the constitutional amendment affecting 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape were thus declared invalid, because 
a procedural requirement for passing a valid law (proper public participa-
tion) was not complied with. however, Parliament and the two provinces 
were given eighteen months to rectify the legislative process. After due 
consultation with Matatiele, the KwaZulu-Natal legislature again voted 
for the boundary change, and the Constitution Thirteenth Amendment 
Act was validly passed in 2007 effecting the change.
The Court has also protected the provinces’ procedural rights when 
Parliament considers legislation affecting provinces, by insisting that 
the correct legislative procedure be followed in the NCOP. Parlia-
ment regarded the Communal Land Rights bill as a bill that did not 
affect provincial interests, a “tagging” decision made by the Speaker 
of the National Assembly and the chairperson of the NCOP.103 Parlia-
ment argued that the bill dealt with “land,” which is a national resid-
ual power, despite the fact that communal land rights by their every 
essence affect the provinces’ concurrent function of “traditional leader-
ship.” As a result, the bill was passed following the so-called section 
75 procedure. The NCOP delegates voted as individual members (not 
as provincial blocs), with a vote rejecting the bill having only delaying 
effect. If the bill was regarded as affecting provincial interests, then the 
provinces had to vote as provincial blocs, and a negative vote could 
be overcome only by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. 
The community of Tongoana, disapproving of the substance of the act, 
attacked the bill’s procedural route, contending it affected the prov-
inces. The Constitutional Court agreed with a generous interpretation 
of “provincial interests.” It rejected the argument that provincial inter-
ests were synonymous with provincial competences and held that the 
test is more broadly drawn: “Any bill whose provisions substantially 
 102 Matatiele Municipality and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others, 2007 (1) bCLR 47 (CC).
 103 Christina Murray and Richard Simeon, “‘Tagging’ bills in Parliament: Section 75 or 
Section 76?,” South African Law Journal 123 (2006): 232.
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affect the interests of provinces must be enacted in accordance with 
the procedure stipulated in section 76.”104 Following the wrong route 
that undermined provincial participation in the law-making process 
rendered the law invalid.
Outside the legislative arena, the courts also safeguarded a province’s 
right to participate in the Judicial Service Commission’s proceedings 
where it affected a judge of the high Court in that province (s. 178(1)(k)). 
The premier of the Western Cape objected for not having been invited to 
participate in the proceedings of the JSC when it had to consider impeach-
ment proceedings against the judge-president of the Western Cape high 
Court for allegedly trying improperly to influence two Constitutional 
Court justices. The Supreme Court sustained a high Court decision that 
set aside the relevant JSC proceedings, because a premier’s right to par-
ticipate was not confined to judicial appointments but extended to the 
conduct of judges of the high Court in that province.105
The procedural requirement of cooperative government that all 
organs of state should “avoid legal proceedings against one another” 
(s. 41(1)(h)(iv)) was enforced against the national government when 
it sought to interdict the KwaZulu-Natal government from establish-
ing a gambling monitoring regime in competition with a national sys-
tem (gambling being a concurrent function). The Constitutional Court 
refused to entertain the application, because the parties displayed no 
effort to settle the matter amicably.106
In summary, the Constitutional Court has confined provincial powers, 
to the clearest expressions in the Constitution. Provincial competences 
also are squeezed from below by an expansive view of municipalities’ 
functions. Consequently, the Court has given further impetus to the 
construction of an hourglass federation, where provinces are squeezed 
thin between the national and local governments. At the same time, 
procedural rights have received full protection from the Court. It may 
well be that the courts are more comfortable enforcing procedural rules 
 104 Tongoane v. Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2010 (8) bCLR 741 (CC)  
para. 72.
 105 hlophe v. Premier of the Western Cape Province; hlophe v. Freedom Under Law 
and Other 2012 (6) bCLR 567 (CC), read with Democratic Alliance v. President of 
the RSA and Others, 2012 (3) bCLR 291 (SCA). because a number of Constitutional 
Court judges were involved in the complaint against the judge-president and could 
therefore not hear the case, the decision of the SCA was the final word on the matter.
 106 National Gambling board.
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than dealing with substantive matters, particularly the complex issue 
of carving out a space for provincial self-government.
These developments have hardly raised a public eyebrow. With most 
provinces not fulfilling their constitutional mandate of service delivery 
of education, health, and housing, more public trust is placed in the 
national government to remedy the ills of the provinces. In most prov-
inces, the public may well support the ANC’s call for an overhaul of the 
provincial system and a reduction in the number of provinces.
3. Significance of the Courts
In assessing the courts’ role in securing federally relevant goals and 
objectives, it should be borne in mind that the federal elements in 
South Africa’s Constitution are not confined to the provincial institu-
tions of self-rule and the shared rule in the National Council of Prov-
inces. The Constitution establishes a system of multi-level government 
where local governments, and the large metropolitan governments in 
particular, play a major role in governance. The courts’ performance 
should thus be assessed on how they have dealt with the entire sys-
tem of multi-level government. On the positive side, the Constitutional 
Court has strengthened the hand of municipalities by interpreting their 
powers generously, not only vis-à-vis the provincial sphere of govern-
ment, but also in competition with the national government. The latter 
government in exercising its broad residual powers cannot automati-
cally override local autonomy. The supportive approach towards local 
government has not been apparent with respect to provincial self-rule. 
Although the Constitutional Court professed to be neither for nor 
against provinces, it did not assert provincial constitutional space when 
it could reasonably have done so. The niggardly approach to provinces 
has of late, however, prompted some dissenting voices seeking to give 
some flesh to the original Constitutional Principle of “legitimate pro-
vincial autonomy.” Overall, the Court has supported the hourglass 
model of multi-level government: a strong supervisory national gov-
ernment, a development-oriented local government at the bottom, and, 
in the middle, a provincial order of government providing ever fewer 
services. but the hourglass is kept functioning by allowing the inter-
governmental sands of procedural compliance to flow freely.
The Court’s concern in the early years was, no doubt, with build-
ing a nation from the fractured past. It emphasized the unitary vision 
of the country when it rejected in 1996 the wayward attempt in the 
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KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution to clamour for more federal-
ism. It may also have been less than charitable to the Western Cape con-
stitution with the province then under the hand of the New National 
Party exhibiting much of the old National Party in attitude. These iso-
lationist forces no longer threaten the united vision of the South African 
nation, and the main opposition party has national ambitions. The sec-
ond reason for a pro-centre stance was the perilous state of provincial 
governance. Little improvement on this score has been witnessed; some 
provinces have retrogressed, as indicated by the national interventions 
in Limpopo and other provinces in 2012.
Why then the support of local municipalities? First, local government 
as a necessity of government poses no centrifugal threat to the nation; to 
the contrary, the cities have been the melting pot where the new South 
African nation is taking shape. Second, despite the failure of many 
municipalities, particularly in rural areas, the large metros and cities 
are reasonably well governed; Johannesburg, Cape Town, Ethekwini 
(Durban), and Tshwane (Pretoria) are functioning adequately and hold 
the key to economic growth and poverty reduction. As to the question 
of why the judiciary supports procedural compliance, the answer may 
lie in the pragmatics of the judicial function, as suggested above.
The judicial contribution to multi-level government has to some 
degree supported federal objectives and goals. As the original purpose 
of ethnic/nationalist accommodation is no longer an overt concern, the 
focus shifts to development goals and limiting the centre’s monopoly 
on power. Support for local government, particularly for the major 
metros having budgets in excess of the smaller provinces, contributes 
to development goals. Collectively provinces and local government 
(again with metros in the forefront) pose a counterweight to central 
dominance.
The Court’s hourglass approach fits snuggly with the national govern-
ment and ANC policy. The ANC never embraced provinces, although 
it may now find it very difficult to unmake the provinces. Over the 
past five years, the debate has moved from the premise that provinces 
have served their initial purpose107 and are therefore now expendable, 
to a more focused concern for greater functionality of perhaps fewer 
provinces. In the ANC’s Policy Document of March 2012, there is a 
call “to reform, rationalize and strengthen provinces” by, among other 
 107 ANC, “Legislature and Governance for a National Democratic Society,” 2007.
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things, having “fewer provinces which are functional, effective, eco-
nomically sustainable, integrate communities on a non-racial basis and 
do away with ethnic boundaries.”108 As noted above, the outcome of 
the ANC National Conference in December 2012 was a cryptic state-
ment: “Provinces [should] be reformed, reduced and strengthened.”109 
The conference further recommended the devolution of certain provin-
cial functions to stronger municipalities (which include the metros). 
This reflects much of the national government’s view, articulated in 
the National Planning Commission’s National Development Plan: Our 
Future – Make It Work.110 Provinces are there to stay, but they must 
become part of the “capable state” that can tackle poverty and inequal-
ity, while an enhanced role is to be accorded to metros. This would 
include the devolution of more provincial powers to metros in the areas 
of housing, transport, and planning.
Although the Constitutional Court may be ad idem with the govern-
ment on multi-level government, its independent stance and exercise 
of judicial powers in other areas of the Constitution do not always sit 
comfortably with the government. Although there are no moves afoot 
to clip the wings of the Constitutional Court (its powers have been 
enhanced when it assumed the function of the court of final appeal in 
all matters), changes to the bench may see judges being more deferen-
tial to Parliament and the executive. however, the Court’s value as an 
independent and fearless guardian of the Constitution is widely appre-
ciated both inside and outside of government. Changes will not come 
easily.
To return to the initial question – does South Africa have a unitarist 
court in a hybrid federal system? – the answer is nuanced. In terms 
of a narrow conception of federalism, focusing alone on the provin-
cial order of government, the Constitutional Court has certainly been 
unitarist. Using a broader definition of federalism that encompasses 
multi-level government, the answer is different, even though it may 
result in an hourglass federation. The Court’s strengthening of local 
government and procedural intergovernmental relations counter-
balances its narrow “fundamental outlook” on the role of provinces. 
however, the consequence of this approach is that the Constitutional 
 108 ANC, Policy Discussion Document, March 2012, Legislature and Governance, 12.
 109 ANC, Resolutions of 53rd National Conference: Legislatures and Governance, 
Resolution 4.2.1 (2012).
 110 National Planning Commission, Development Plan: Our Future, 434–5.
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Court has not breathed life into the constitutional space for provincial 
self-governance.
Given the looming reform of provinces and local government, the 
Court is bound in the short term to play at the side lines of the main 
game. The main actors shaping the system are the ANC (determining 
policy on provinces and local government), the government imple-
menting the structure and the National Treasury giving budget effect to 
policy (and at times determining policy through budget choices). The 
Constitutional Court will, however, play a decisive role in changing the 
number and boundaries of provinces, demanding scrupulous compli-
ance with procedures.
What would strengthen the courts’ role in supporting or improving the 
functioning of multi-level government? Ironically, the provinces them-
selves could be the most important actors in contributing to a more sym-
pathetic court. Although nation building is stumbling along, territorially 
based centrifugal and isolationist tendencies have evaporated. The cap-
turing of the Western Cape by the DA in 2009 was not an attempt at isola-
tion, but a platform for expansion to other provinces.111 Nation building 
per se may thus no longer be a burning concern for the Court. The other 
ostensible reason for the Court’s apathy towards provinces could be the 
continued poor performance of seven out of the nine provinces. yet, 
in many instances, national departments fare no better than provincial 
ones. The South African Social Security Agency, which took over the dis-
tribution of social grants from provinces, has not been a shining example 
of efficiency and financial rectitude.112 yet the assumption remains that 
the national government does better. Although poor administration is a 
legitimate concern, it could also hide a deeper, underlying ideological 
view that sees centralization and uniformity as values in themselves and 
preferable to regional experimentation and innovation.
 111 In the May 2014 national and provincial elections, the DA increased its percentage 
of the vote from 17 to 23 per cent nationally. More importantly, the ANC retained 
the most populous and wealthiest province, Gauteng, with a slender margin 
of 53 per cent. In the 2016 local government elections it may lose its majority in 
Gauteng’s three metropolitan municipalities.
 112 For example, in AllPay Consolidated Investment holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others 
v. Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency and Others 
(Corruption Watch and Another as Amici Curiae), 2014 (1) bCLR 1 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court set aside a massive tender award for the distribution of grants 
because of the defective management of the tender process.
This content downloaded from 196.11.235.238 on Tue, 09 Apr 2019 11:47:09 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
366 Courts in Federal Countries
The answer to both impediments lies with provinces themselves. If 
provinces show themselves not as dens of patronage and maladmin-
istration but as capable and effective instruments of governance and 
development, and if they add value through diversity, the courts might 
see the advantage of expanding the provinces’ constitutional space. 
This is best illustrated in the contested appointment of the provincial 
commission of inquiry in the Western Cape to investigate the failure of 
the South African Police Service (SAPS) to provide safety and security 
in Khayalitsha,113 Given this failure, the Court asserted and protected 
the province’s right (and duty) to call the SAPS to account in order to 
better protect its residents. The same argument applies to municipali-
ties. A virtuous circle may then emerge: better subnational governance 
makes for better judgments.
 113 Minister of Police and Others v. Premier of the Western Cape.
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